What is Derrida's criticism of Heidegger

HARALD KERBER

I would first like to refer to Heidegger and Hegel. The subject of identity and difference becomes the subject of Heidegger's analysis of Hegel. It is about the ontical-ontological difference between being and being. To this end, Heidegger deals with the beginning of Hegel's logic. According to this beginning, in Hegel being is first of all the "indefinite immediate" (Hegel 1986, 83). It is pure thought and therefore nothing. Being and nothing are immediately identical. There is, one could say, no difference. This, however, shows itself in becoming and in arising and passing away. Moreover, the concept of the indeterminate immediate is an abstraction from the mediation of all beings, as is shown in the logic of essence. To this extent, one then has to read becoming in Hegel as the truth of being and nothing, where being is understood as coming from nothing and nothing from being. If here the change from being to nothing and nothing to being is more or less immediate, then this already changes in Dasein, where from being, namely the one side of being and nothing, the opposition of being and nothing comes into play. Nothing is then the ever determined nothing in relation to the ever determined being as Dasein or something from which it comes. This entire, one could say asymmetrical ductus of being and nothing goes over the levels of being, essence and then conceptual logic. The end of essential logic culminates in the concept of reality, and it leads over into the logic of the concept. Reality, as stated in the philosophy of law, is identical with reasonableness. Only the reasonable is real and the real is reasonable. Reason, however, is linked to the double form of the concept as the concept of the concept, the self-understanding. This self-understanding is presented as the movement of the concept, the disengagement of oneself from the concept, and the return of the concept to itself. It is, and here all forms of difference are abolished from the point of view of opposition in identity, a circle in circles and in this way represents a self-containedness. In this way, Hegelian logic generates itself from itself. It does not start from an unequivocal first, as z. B. Descartes, who, through absolute doubt, saw absolute certainty in I-thinking, the res cogitans. Hegelian logic (like the phenomenology of spirit) is not only an expression of doubt, but of absolute despair at every firm hold. The dialectic dissolves all positivities, but reaches itself again, as in absolute knowledge in phenomenology and in the concept of double identity in logic in the concept of the idea to a second form of positivity.

The problem that shows itself in Hegelian logic is the definition of the double negation as affirmation. In the affirmative the dialectic is abolished. The identical as double identity, as identity of identity and non-identity, posits identity as the abolition of all opposites in the absolute subject. The subject is identical subject-object as subject. This subject-object structure is not what first made the subject subject and the object first became an object, a relation between subject and object, according to Adorno versus Husserl: "Because the concept of the subject cannot be emancipated from existence, from the 'object' like that of the object from the subjective thought function "(Adorno 1975, 123). Both are neither in "mere opposition to one another", nor are they identical in the sense of an absolute subjectivity. The recourse to an absolute subject stops the dialectic. It is the secret positivism of the Hegelian philosophy.

In contrast to Hegel, for Heidegger the matter of thinking is "difference as difference" instead of identity (Heidegger 1990, 37). The concept of "abolition", which plays such a strong role in Hegel's theory, has been abandoned because it is connected with that of negativity. The subject of difference here means a post-metaphysical thinking. In Heidegger's work, she means a critique of occidental metaphysics, in which the ontical-ontological difference between being and being has been arbitrated in favor of certain concepts of being. The "difference between being and being" remains unquestioned. The difference itself appears as the unthought. From this “unthought” it goes “into what is to be thought” as “oblivion of difference” (ibid., 40). This is demonstrated by the Hegelian logic. As I said, it operates with the concept of the identity of identity and the non-identical, with the abolition of all differences, but abolition meant in the Hegelian threefold sense. This is where Hegel's concept of God figures. In the sense of Heidegger, the Hegelian philosophy is "onto-theology" (ibid., 45), understood as "thinking thinking as being circling within itself" (ibid., 44). Such onto-theology, and this is where Heidegger meets with all post-metaphysical thinking, has now "become questionable for thinking" (ibid., 45). This post-metaphysical thinking is now here with Heidegger - and thus also with Derrida - a mere consideration of the history of metaphysics.

The ontic-ontological difference is two-sided, namely as the difference between being and being both in the sense of the genitive subiectivus and the genitive obiectivus. Both being and being are in difference. Both appear "each in their own way from the difference" (ibid., 55). The difference is thus initially understood as a principle in which there is neither a priority of being nor of beings. Nevertheless, this difference is a difference that opens up in the disguise of being by being. The difference does not appear as definite, but as universal it shapes the history of beings as the history of misrepresentations themselves. For "the essence of being", says Heidegger, there is "in beings" "nowhere (...) an example" (ibid., 58).

As I said, Heidegger conceives being from the critique of the history of metaphysics. It is the forgotten that remains forgotten within metaphysics. Forgetting here means the forgetting of a foundation relationship, namely the power of being of all beings. Metaphysics, which can be understood as a unity under the principle of identity, transfers this foundation relationship to relativity. Forgetting this difference between being and being is forgetting that does not want to forget anything. But in this non-forgetting of forgetting lies the forgetting of difference.

The subject of the difference in Derrida owes, in addition to the reference to Heidegger, to a not insignificant extent to the examination of de Saussure's linguistics, to which I want to speak briefly before I go into Derrida.

First of all, it is perhaps important to say that, according to de Saussure, "language (...) is an agreement" and "the nature of the sign about which one has agreed" is "indifferent" (de Saussure 1967, 12). Signs have no representational character and language is "not a function of the speaking person" (ibid., 16), but has a social character. According to de Saussure, the linguistic sign "does not combine a name and a thing, but an idea and a sound image" (ibid., 77). So the sign is the "whole" of what is significant and what is signified. There is only an arbitrary relationship between the designation and the designated. In this respect, the linguistic sign itself is "arbitrary" (ibid., 79). It's not a symbol of a thing. This arbitrariness is social, i. H. communicated linguistically. It is an "inherited product" (ibid., 84).

On the one hand, this depends on the unchangeability of the sign. Its arbitrariness is accepted. Precisely because the sign is arbitrary, says de Saussure, "there is no other law for it (that is, no immanent reasonableness, H. K.) than that of tradition" (ibid., 87). On the other hand, the sign is also changeable precisely because of its arbitrariness. It reproduces in time. According to de Saussure, such changes and transformations are an expression of a "shift in the relationship between what is designated and what is designated" (ibid., 88). This concept of displacement then becomes relevant for Derrida and Deleuze, albeit in a different way. The relationship between designation and what is designated is going crazy step by step. According to de Saussure, the "arbitrariness" of the sign "theoretically means the possibility of establishing any relationship between the phonetic matter and the ideas" (ibid., 89), and so both elements of the sign "lead their own lives in one" by the way unknown relationship "(ibid., 89f). De Saussure then goes into detail on the difference between the unity of the sign in its duality and the distinction between imagination and speech sound, both in terms of imagination and sound image, which explains more precisely what is meant by displacement. I cannot go into that separately here. In any case, the idea depends on the position of the sound image in the linguistic system and not the sound image on the idea. The shifts result from the ever changing position of the sound images with regard to the ideas that are articulated through them within a linguistic system, but not from the change in ideas independent of language with regard to their phonetic articulation. Here it is already the game of the signifiers that then becomes so decisive for neostructuralism. Overall, the following applies to de Saussure: "Although what is designated and designation, taken individually, are only differential and negative, their connection is a positive fact" (ibid., 144).

This kind of thinking, in which there is no longer any preceding object that calls for expression, is e.g. B. Adorno criticized it as a positivist. "The resolute separation, which declares the course of the word to be accidental and the assignment to the object (here in de Saussure" Presentation ", H. K.) as arbitrary, does away with the superstitious mixture of word and thing" (Adorno 1984, 187f). The name then no longer names something, but "changes into arbitrary and manageable names" (ibid., 188).

In contrast to Adorno, who works on an obsessive concept of identity in favor of the non-identical, which is being suppressed here, the principle of difference in neostructuralism is, as it were, total. This is exemplified by Derrida.

Derrida accepts the arbitrariness of signs, as it is discussed by de Saussure, but in contrast to this, who favors language over writing, recurs on writing itself and accuses de Saussure of still being attached to metaphysical thinking, although at the same time he does not like de Saussure (and previously Hegel), who means the phonetic alphabet as the highest form of writing, but wants to see writing disconnected from it.

At de Saussure, language and writing are "two different systems of signs". The latter only represents the former. But it "takes more and more the main role for itself" (de Saussure 1967, 28). And so one attaches greater importance to the representation than to the "characters themselves". For de Saussure this is a common "mistake" (ibid., 29). For him, the authority of writing over language can be explained by the fact that it appears as a "fixed object". The visual takes precedence over the acoustic. For de Saussure, the typeface "at the expense of the sound" is imprinted. And ergo: "In the end you forget that you learn to speak before you learn to write and the natural relationship is reversed". - You could call that something like reification -.

In contrast, for Derrida, also in ontogenesis, writing takes precedence over speaking. For him, the priority of speaking over writing must be an expression of an intentionality and afflicted with an ontological and subject-theoretical character. B. criticized the speech act theory of Austin. For de Saussure, however, the script "assumes a meaning to which it has no right" (ibid., 30).

For Derrida, an ethnocentrism or logocentrism, a "metaphysics of phonetic writing" (Derrida 1994, 11), which he rejects, registers itself in the hierarchy of painting from wedge to letter writing. For him, hierarchical thinking styles are single-line and origin-theoretical. He is concerned with the deconstruction of certain relationships between "spoken word and writing" (ibid., 14), after which the topic of difference opens up in writing itself. So far, it seemed, according to Derrida, as if language were "fringed by the infinite signified that seemed to go beyond language" (ibid., 16). This infinite signified has a pre-lingual character; it is to be understood as the "inconsistent double of a higher signifier, the signifier of the signifier" (ibid., 17). That means z. B. Hegel's absolute subject as the unity of the unity and non-unity of subject and object. Here writing is still the "auxiliary form of language". The relationship between the two is reversed in Derrida. In the primacy of writing over language, which is ultimately tied to a subject concept that spins everything, there is itself the thought of difference, expressed in the expression "différance", which means neither a specific word nor a concept. The idea of ​​difference is no longer ignited here, as with Adorno, by a criticism of a concept of identity in which the nonidentical is thought of as canceled, as with Hegel, but rather it bids farewell to the concept of identity as such.

For Derrida, the "extension of the term language (...) becomes limitless". The language is not identical to a particular script. In this respect, there is also - in terms of origin theory - no first script, and since script is no longer a supplement to the spoken word, since it detaches itself from a particular language. Everything has the character of a supplement. In this respect Derrida pleads for "a new logic of the 'supplement'". The "economy" (ibid., 18f) of the "‘ self-in-speaking-understanding "(ibid., 19), which is based on the phonetic language and which goes back to Aristotle but also concerns Hegel's circular idea, is criticized. According to Derrida, this topic "dominated the history of the world (...) and (...) even the idea of ​​the world" (ibid., 19) and all the corresponding binary constructions for an entire epoch.

So z. B. in the sense of the pure idea of ​​difference deconstructs the binary of transcendentality and empiricism in Kant. Such deconstruction, however, is not caught up with in terms of social theory and criticism, but is presented as a critique of the two-valued nature of traditional epistemology in general. The transcendentality, the unifying subject, the I-think, which according to Kant should be able to accompany all my ideas, is not, as z. B. in the concept of value objectification, traced back to a society in which, as Marx formulates, it is value itself that appears as "the overarching subject of a (...) process", "in which it soon assumes the form of money and the form of goods, soon slips off, but in this alternation maintains and stretches "(Marx 1962, 169).

For Derrida, the idea of ​​presence (which he also and just found in Husserl) generally dissolves in the thought of writing. The radicalized script "no longer comes from a logo". It shows the "deconstruction of all meanings whose origin lies in the meaning of the logos" (Derrida 1994, 23). For him, the traditional logocentric difference sticks to that of the sensual and the intelligible. The intelligible - the signified - refers to an "absolute (n) logos" (ibid., 28); B. in the Middle Ages on God. The sensual, the signifier, is only the expression of the intelligible. This then extends to the modern concept of the subject, which is, as it were, the intelligibility in relation to all of its sensual forms of expression.

For Derrida, as for Heidegger, the history of metaphysics as the history of logocentrism or onto-theology and thus a history of the sign that relates to a specifically posited designation, the history of nihilism since Nietzsche. In contrast to his assessment of Nietzsche, however, in Heidegger he still sees logocentrism at work in a certain way, since in the ontical-ontological difference, ultimately, being is referred to as being as the first in relation to all that is. "The word 'being'", although according to Heidegger the meaning of being does not lie in the word and also not in the concept of being, then becomes an "'original word'" (ibid., 39). Although the "'voice of being'" in Heidegger is silent, i. H. a-phonetic. Heidegger is thus "included" in metaphysics and transcends it "at the same time" (ibid., 41).

For him, Derrida, the sense of being takes the form of an "outrageous sense (s)" as a "significant trace".This is where différance nests as the production of differentiation. The a is voiceless here and différance is a purely made-up word. Différance is neither a word nor a concept and therefore does not represent an "origin" (ibid., 44). The exit from différance is understood as a deconstruction. According to Derrida, similar to how Hegel wants to place himself in the power of his opponent and how Heidegger does this with regard to Hegel and in the sense of what Adorno understands by immanent criticism, "this has to operate from within, and all subversive, strategic and critical." to use economic means of the old structure ".

In this context z. B. argued against Hegel that he degraded writing in favor of language. The writing appears as "self-forgetfulness (...) alienation", one could say alienation or dissimulation in the sense of de Saussure, as the "opposite (...) of memory" (ibid., 45) in to-oneself -Come of the Spirit. If in Hegel there is the concept of abolition, which is conceived in such a way that substance should become the subject, then this thought disappears in the policontexturality of pure writing. The "non-phonetic writing breaks the name" as a unity of itself and that of others, according to Hegel the expression God. The non-phonetic script, on the other hand, describes "relations, not names" (ibid., 47). This thought of the relation, which z. B. could refer to the relation of subject and object, or, according to Adorno, to the relation of spirit and given, whereby dialectics would be carried out as negative concretely, is only introduced here in the sense of a general concept of shifts and postponements of the signifier . The primacy of the object, which motivates every materialistic objection to the idealistic category of cancellation, is not thematic in it. For Derrida, referring to the end of the phenomenology of the mind, the "horizon of absolute knowledge (...) is the extinction of writing in the logos, the resumption of the trace in the parousia, the reappropriation of the difference" (ibid., 48 ), then this is z. B. not sued in favor of a concept of experience (as e.g. in hermeneutics in Gadamer), where there is an openness to the unreductibility of the sphere of the object in relation to the appropriating subject, but, as Welsch puts it, in favor of a "hermeneutics" the "significant chains" (Welsch 1995, 261). Derrida emphasizes, however, in the sense of his own orientation towards difference, that Hegel is also "the thinker of irreducible difference" (Derrida 1994, 48) in relation to the idea of ​​double identity.

In Derrida, as shown, the expression of différance implies that this is no longer the "opposition between the sensitive and the intelligible", but rather a movement "of the différance (with a) between two différences or between two Letters "(Derrida 1988, 31). In this respect there is no presence. Thinking in terms of orders, the outcome of axioms, postulates and definitions is inconceivable in this way. Rather, it is about dispersion and displacement, dissemination, temporization and temporalization, a "time becoming of space and space becoming of time". Différance in this sense means a "process of division and division, the constituted products and effects of which would be the différents or the différences" (ibid., 34). This is neither a purely active nor a passive process, neither the activity of a subject nor an suffering through an object. In this sense, the "temporization-temporalization" no longer merges "in the horizon of what is present" (ibid., 36). The movement of meaning is only possible if, as Derrida says, "every so-called 'present' element that appears on the scene of presence relates to something other than itself". It contains the characteristic of the past element in itself and allows itself to be "hollowed out" by its "relationship to a future element". Herein lies the thought of the trace, which could never, and that means in the sense of a full presence, be realized through its disappearance. That which could be the present - whether as pure presentness, a perfect past or a perfect future - as being-to-itself of the element in its otherness, is dissolved by being-always-different in being-self. And so: "An interval must separate it (the element, HK) from what it is not in order for it to be itself, but this interval, which it constitutes as the present, must at the same time separate the present from itself, and so with from the present, everything that can be thought of it, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, especially the substance or the subject "(ibid., 39). It's about relationships of differentiation and postponement. In detail it is a matter of "that one of the terms appears as différance of the other, as the other, differentiated / postponed (différé) in the economy of the same, the intelligible as differing from the sensual (différant), as postponed sensuality (différé); the term as differentiated / postponed - distinguishing / postponing intuition (différée - différante); culture as differentiated / postponed - distinguishing / postponing nature (différée - différante); every other of the physical - techne, nomos, thesis, society , Freedom, history, spirit etc. - as a postponed physis (différée) or as a distinctive physis (différante). Physis in différance "(ibid., 43). - The equality shows in the difference. By the difference that can never be undone, there is always a shift in terms of equality that can never be achieved. One speaks for the other and the other for another. The other remains in the one the other.

This structure is here naturalized into pure quantity and "power differences". So z. B. also interpreted Freud's theory of the unconscious. For Derrida it is "a theory of the cipher (or the trace) and at the same time an energetics". In this sense it is to be understood when Derrida says that "all conceptual opposites that shape Freudian thinking (...) relate to one another as moments of a detour in the economy of différance" (ibid., 44) . B. pleasure and reality principle. Instead of the creation of the present, what is involved here is an "irreversible loss of the present, irreversible wear and tear of energy", to (in the sense of Batailles) the process of "unconditional expenditure" (ibid., 45). For Derrida, under the concept of pure energetics, the unconscious pushes itself on, differs from itself, "weaves itself out of differences and sends representatives" (ibid., 46). The unconscious is not, as Deleuze also tries to show, without difference. It is precisely here that the primacy of the signifier expresses itself in relation to a unifying concept of consciousness. Displacement and compression are understood in terms of language theory. B. Lacan, in the sense that the shift is about "the transition from one to the other signifier" and the compression is about the "substitution of one signifier by another" (Welsch 1995, 281). Derrida criticizes Lacan for having remained "phallocentric and, moreover, logocentric, phonocentric and presence-bound" (ibid., 284).

There is a "structure of afterwardness" as a "'past' that never exists and never becomes present" (Derrida 1988, 46); H. "was never present". I. E. the being of beings, as initially in the sense of Heidegger, eludes. The difference between being and being remains. The difference of the difference itself, the différance "is not". But with regard to the question of the meaning of being, Derrida, as already briefly shown, differs from Heidegger. As such, it would have become "thought or said in its secret". However, this implies, however, presence. In contrast, "the différance is 'older' in a certain and extremely peculiar way than the ontological difference or the truth of being". The trace, or the différance, has "no meaning" and "is" (ibid., 47). She doesn't appear. "As always differing, the trace never presents itself as such. It goes out when it appears, becomes voiceless when it sounds, like the a when it is written, inscribes its pyramid in the différance".

For Heidegger, as Derrida quotes, "the forgetting of being (...) is the forgetting of the difference between being and being '" (ibid., 48). The "forgotten of metaphysics" then "disappeared without leaving a trace. Even the trace of the difference has disappeared", as the "disappearance of the trace of the trace" (ibid., 49). But Heidegger formulates, and this is where Derrida's criticism of Heidegger begins in the sense of différance: "'The difference between being and being can, however, only come into an experience as a forgotten one if it already reveals and reveals itself with the presence of what is present has shaped such a trace that is preserved in the language to which being comes' "(ibid., 50). Différance itself remains "a metaphysical name", but as such, which according to Derrida is still "'older" "than being," has no name in our language ". There is no name for them, "not even that of the différance". Only “nominal effects are brought about”, which then “brings about the nominal effect 'différance' itself” (ibid., 51). Instead of a "lost home of thought", summed up in the name, there is only (and this also with Deleuze, HK) the pure "affirmation" of the lack of origin as "play (...), as laughter and as dance", see above how Nietzsche lets his Zarathustra appear. If there is no "unique name" (ibid., 52), no originality, there is also no hope.

For Adorno, in order to confront his approach once again with that of Derrida, who, like Derrida, criticizes the history of metaphysics, there is nonetheless a recourse to the name as a similarity relationship between thought and thought, precisely against the principle of identity. The name, the individual, takes the place of the concept and the absolute subject. For Derrida (as well as Deleuze), however, the old metaphysical history itself is still evident in such thinking. Moreover, Adorno's representation of difference from the point of view of identity means difference as negative, that as contradiction under the premise of the principle of consistency set with identity occurs, while the neostructuralists but positively assume the same in contrast to identity.

For Deleuze, difference takes the place of identity, negation, representation, subject and God in an even more decided way than Derrida. It's about repetition and difference. Repetition does not have the character of generality. In such a system (and Adorno also criticizes this) there is an order of similarities and equivalences. The repetition makes clear the difference to what is repeated. But what is repeated is itself a repetition in relation to another that is repeated. So there is no unity, no equality. Everything that is happens through shifting without anything last or first shifted. Repetition happens out of will, according to Nietzsche. And it is the small differences that show up in Kierkegaard's diary of the seducer. Deleuze refers to Zarathustra's imperative against the generality of the moral law in Kant, namely: "You should want whatever you want so that you also want its eternal return" (Deleuze 1992, 22). The second coming does not mean a remembrance, no anamnesis in the sense of Plato and how it actually shaped Hegel's philosophy (see Kojève). Repetition has nothing to do with a pure me and I mean memory that encompasses everything. Repetition would be "pseudo-repetition of special cases" (ibid., 23). Repetition, on the other hand, from the point of view of difference, means the second "not a second time" the same, but the infinite that is predicated of a single time, the eternity that is predicated of a moment, the unconscious that is predicated by the consciousness, the n- th power ".

This figure of thought can be found roughly, albeit without recourse to the unconscious, in Adorno, both against the monotony of the repetition of individual cases under a generic term, as in subsumption-logical thinking, which Hegel criticized in Kant, as well as against the Hegelian identity, according to which the infinite is thought to be affirmative in the sense of a closed circle with regard to the fact that every finite has its own infinite in itself and thus goes beyond itself. And like Adorno, Deleuze formulates: "Hegel replaces the true relationship between the singular and the universal in the idea with the abstract relationship between the particular and the concept in general" (ibid., 26).

Marx had already criticized the self-movement of the concept in Hegel in favor of the concrete-general of social relations presupposed by the concept. As Adorno shows, the special is stripped of its particularity in it. With Hegel, however, the category of mediation is central to all original-philosophical thinking. For him, such mediation also amounts to a second immediacy in the movement of the concept's coming to itself, which already has its fundamentum in re in the indistinguishability of being and nothing at the beginning of logic, but it still means first on the one hand, that every thing goes along with its own difference and mediation is the category in which the differences are related to one another without the difference being surrendered, but then also in a higher unity. With Adorno in particular, this category becomes important for explaining the mediation of the object by the subject, which as mediating must already be mediated, whereby the object remains presupposed to the subject. On the other hand, the neostructuralists now go back to the celebration of pure immediacy, the pure givenness of what is repeated. Deleuze formulates against Hegel: "One must recognize how Hegel distorts and falsifies the immediate in order to base his dialectic on this incomprehension and to introduce the mediation into a movement that is only that of his own thinking and the generalities of this thinking. The speculative Sequences replace the coexistence, cover the opposites and hide the repetitions ". Such a form of coexistence, regardless of the correctness of the criticism of the speculative in Hegelian philosophy, is positivity. The understanding of Marx's theory takes place correspondingly in relation to the concept of the opposite in Hegel from the point of view of positive difference theory. Not, as it is formulated against Hegel, "the difference presupposes the opposition, but the opposition presupposes the difference; and far from dissolving it, (...) the opposition distorts and falsifies the difference" (ibid., 77f).

According to Deleuze, difference, that is the quintessence here, "cannot be reduced to contradiction" (ibid., 78). And so the "power of the negative" is also criticized in Hegel. For Deleuze, when Althusser went back to the structuralist interpretation of Marx's theory, Marx's concept of abstract work expresses the form of pure "differential relationships between differential elements: production and property relationships that are established not between concrete people but between atoms who are bearers of labor or representatives of property "(ibid., 237). For Deleuze, the economic becomes "varieties" of these "differential quotients" (ibid., 239). The immanent contradiction of the capital relation is reduced to a "differential virtuality" which is covered by certain "actuality forms". It is nothing other than "the totality of the problems that a given society faces, the synthetic and problematizing field of this society" (ibid., 238) - whatever that means.

In this way, through a pure difference-theoretical concept of virtuality and actuality of problems and their possible solutions, Marx's proposition is then interpreted that humanity only ever sets itself tasks that it can solve. For Deleuze, therefore, "the category of differentiation within a social diversity (division of labor) in capital takes the place of the Hegelian concepts of opposition, contradiction and alienation" (ibid., 262). A) the difference between the problem of the successive epochs of production and the structure of capital is not discussed here, and b) the entire problem of the relationship between idealistic philosophy and bourgeois-capitalist society, and c) the difference between the concept of alienation and reification is not included Hegel and Marx. The capital relation itself appears from the point of view of positive-differential relations as a relation of implicit affirmation.

Deleuze goes into the problem between concept and content of the concept when he emphasizes that the predicates, so to speak as special attribute attributions, "" preserve "themselves" as moments of the concept and (...) "work" in the subject ascribe them to themselves ". In Hegel's conceptual logic, this problem is solved by the fact that both the subject of a sentence and its predicates are more limited and broader in relation to one another and thus go beyond the singular judgment, which then leads to the concept of the concept, the identical subject-object . The system as a whole no longer has the character of a judgment structure. Deleuze sees it similarly in relation to Hegel when he says that the "infinite conceptual content (...) enables remembering and recognition, memory and self-awareness". For him, like it was for Derrida in the phenomenon of language, this is representational thinking. The conceptual differences are abolished here in the universal mediation. Deleuze, on the other hand, argues that empirically, depending on the different sentence subject, one and the same predicate assumes a different valence and, on the other hand, remains unchangeable. And that is precisely why, according to him, "the content of the concept is infinite". In the classification, however, there are so-called "artificial blockages" (ibid., 28). They conflict with the substantive process of changing the predicate depending on the sentence subject. In contrast, Deleuze assumes a so-called "natural blocking of the concept" in the sense of the openness of infinity. According to him, it refers to a "dialectic of existence". This dialectic has the character that in the concept there is an identity which appears in existence as a repetition. And it is precisely this natural blocking that forms "a real repetition in existence instead of a similarity order in thinking" (ibid., 29), as in the case of the classifications. In relation to the concept and conceptual differences, for Deleuze non-conceptual internal differences are precisely what he starts from, similar to Derrida. They shape "the figures of repetition" and "space and time are themselves media of repetition" (ibid., 30). The ego, if one assumes it, always only sanctions what is already past, without being able to elevate it to something present, as in Derrida. Every "product" is "already thought of and recognized as past" (ibid., 31).

For Deleuze, "the discrete (Kant, HK), the alienated (Hegel, HK), the repressed (Freud, HK) (...) are the three cases of natural blocking that correspond to the nominal concepts, the concepts of nature and the concepts of freedom ". In all three cases, however, he emphasizes, one invokes "the form of the identical in the concept", the form of the same in the representation, in order to do justice to the repetition. The lack of concept in the repetition and thus the difference without concept are to be settled here in the sense of an "indifferent difference" in the unity of the concept. The repetition appears in all three cases as deficient, negative. "In all" three cases "repeats what repeats, only because it does not 'understand', does not remember, does not know or is unconscious". Blockages have to be resolved here - conceptually. In contrast, Deleuze thinks: "But natural blocking itself requires an overarching positive (!) Force, which it and, together with it, can explain the repetition."

In this context, Deleuze speaks of Freud's "beyond the pleasure principle" with regard to the third case and shows that according to this, "the death instinct is named as the original positive principle for repetition" (ibid., 33). With Freud it is the theme of the return into the inorganic and the contrast between Eros and Thanatos, where Eros is only a detour in relation to the need to sink back into the inorganic. Perhaps we would like to remind you of Marcuse, who tries to show in his book: "Instinct structure and society" that the death instinct owes itself to a certain destructive reality, a certain reality principle compared to a possible other that no longer produces such destructive traits. The neostructuralists, on the other hand, assume a one-line relationship between reality and pleasure principle and abandon this construction with the middle Freud with regard to the subject of Eros and Thanatos, whereby Thanatos, in contrast to Freud, is "the most positive", a "transcendental positive " becomes.

The theme of death, the pyramidal of the 'a' in the différance in Derrida, is, since it is then a 'nothing', but in Deleuze, more precisely in contrast to nothing in Hegel, means the bracketed not in being, always only in other forms and roles that refer to nothing but the unity of themselves can be grasped. In this respect, disguises and masks or 'shifts' do not refer to something intrinsic that is disguised and shifted or repeated in them, but rather they are "the inner genetic elements of the repetition itself". This is the structure of the unconscious here. Deleuze, on the other hand, sees a material model in Freud's thought of death. But death has "nothing to do with a material model". According to Deleuze, on the other hand, the death instinct is in a "spiritual relationship to the masks and travesties" and repetition is then nothing other than that "that disguises itself by constituting itself and only constitutes itself insofar as it disguises itself". And "the masks do not cover anything, only other masks. There is no first term that would be repeated; and the love of children for the mother repeats other loves that we feel as adults for other women" (ibid., 34). Everything is a simulacrum. The question of truth or falsehood and their possible relationship to one another becomes obsolete. With Deleuze this leads to the idea of ​​the rhizome versus the tree structure, with Derrida it is the idea of ​​the trace and the supplement. And so there is "nothing that is repeated that can be isolated or abstracted from the repetition in which it is formed, but also hides". This concealment is reminiscent of Heidegger's being, in any case it does not refer to anything ultimate, it is thought anti-ontological. That nothing is disguised and there is nothing that disguises means: "The same thing disguised and is disguised". It is a puzzle, "the illusion is the letter of the repetition itself" and "by virtue of the disguise and the order of the symbol the difference is contained in the repetition". It is the death instinct itself that "feeds the masks and roles (...)". And ergo: "The mask is the true subject of repetition".

If Marx, in order to attempt a comparison, spoke of people as character masks with regard to the capitalist production relations and he explained this under the condition of the reversal of human and factual contexts, then precisely this relation is positively influenced in neostructuralism. And accordingly it is said against Freud: "I do not repeat because I suppress. I suppress because I repeat, I forget because I repeat" (ibid., 35).

Enlightenment, awareness is not required. That is added to the history of metaphysics. Repetition and forgetting are connected accordingly. On the other hand, z. For Adorno, for example, it is precisely in the compulsion to identify, where nothing is to be forgotten, that forgetting takes place. Real non-forgetting presupposes a relation of forgetting and non-forgetting = experience. Pure forgetting, however, and this also applies to Derrida's writing, is reification. There is no longer any need to forget because one has already forgotten.

The repetition is its own therapy, so in the transference in the analytic situation. "If," says Deleuze, "repetition makes us sick, it is precisely because of it that we are cured" (ibid., 36). No original scene is replayed in the transmission. The cure itself is "a journey to the cause of repetition". The repetition expresses "the selective play of our illness and our health, our corruption and our salvation". In this way one becomes "'free" "(ibid., 37): = schizoanalysis.

For Deleuze, this theme of coercion and freedom is also evident in the artist. The work of art consists of constant asymmetries, shifts, where one specimen accommodates itself to another and at the same time goes beyond it. The entire figure then results from these immanent imbalances between the specimens. In the artistic production it always jumps out more than was intended in the respective specimens, the causative elements for certain effects. There is so much more of the effects in relation to the causes. This is z. B. in contrast to Hegel's concept of interaction, where causes and effects are intertwined. Due to the mutual offset of the specimens to one another, the cause is not determined by the effects. And accordingly for Deleuze in this sense the "'lack of symmetry" "is the" origin and positivity of the causal process. It is positivity itself ". The lack of symmetry, the non- or A-symmetry means the shift. It is a "signaling process". "Signal" is a system of asymmetrical elements and orders of disparate sizes. "Signs" are what Deleuze calls "what happens in such a system, what flashes up in the interval". The sign is the respective effect as an expression of the asymmetry and the attempt to remove it. The sign itself thus implies "an inner difference". This goes in the direction of the arbitrariness of the significant in de Saussure. What the sign is supposed to signify is itself 'mediated' through the sign, through its displacement. And so it never has a representational character.

A distinction is then made here between "two types of repetition", namely one "which only affects the abstract overall effect" and another which means "the effective cause" (ibid., 38). The first form of repetition "is static, the other dynamic". Both repetitions are related. "The first repetition is" the "repetition of the same, which is made explicit through the identity of the concept or the representation; the second is that which embraces the difference and embraces itself in the otherness of the idea, in the heterogeneity of an 'appresentation' One is negative, due to the lack of the concept, the other affirmative, due to the excess of the idea. One is hypothetical, the other categorical. One is repetition in the effect, the other (Nietzsche: Zarathustra, HK) in the Cause. One is extensive, the other intense. One is ordinary, the other distinguished and singular. One is horizontal, the other vertical. One is unfolded, explicated; the other enveloped and needs to be explicated. One is revolutionary One consists of equality, commensurability, symmetry, the other is based on the unequal, incommensurable or asymmetrical. One is materi ell, the other spiritually (...) one is inanimate, the other contains the secret of our death and life (...) one is a 'naked' repetition, the other a clothed repetition that forms itself by she dresses, masks, disguises herself. One consists of exactness, the other corresponds to the criterion of authenticity "(ibid., 42f). And: One" is just the outer shell, the abstract effect ", the other" is the singular subject, the heart and the interiority the other, the depth of the other "(ibid., 43).

The first, naked repetition merges with the general public, the second does not. But this generality is only the "cover" for the internal repetition, which is "affected by an order of difference". In contrast, the "non-correspondence between difference and repetition (...) justifies the order of the general" (ibid., 44).

The theme of repetition in one with the forgetting that lies in the difference is exemplified by Luhmann. With regard to the phenomenon of observation, which is a distinguishing designation from the point of view of the two-sided shape, it follows that only that which is not forgotten is "repeatable". "Repeatable", says Luhmann, "is not the object that explains repeatability, as it were. Only the operation itself is repeatable, and this only thanks to recursive networking with other operations" (Luhmann 1990, 107). The constitution of the object results from the recursiveness. Similar to the neo-structuralists, this also affects the concept of sign. There is no connection between signs and designations, but, according to Luhmann, "a structure of the autopoesis of communication". The subject of the difference in the repetition becomes clear in the fact that repetition "must take place at different times, that is, under different circumstances". One could say that there are always shifts here, unlike from the point of view of the ceteris paribus theorem. Nevertheless, according to Luhmann - and here in reference to Heinz von Förster - so-called eigenvalues ​​develop. This is caught up with the expressions "condensation" and "confirmation". Generalizing condensation means "reduction to the identical". "Something specific for repeated designation" is extracted here. "The conditions of repeatability must be specified as conditions of sameness, as conditions of recognizability and reusability of the same". When it comes to communication, these are words. But the identical must always "take place in a different situation and incorporate its otherness. This happens through the generalizing confirmation". The identical always takes on "new references", gains "fullness of meaning" (ibid., 108). And here the repeated term "memory" occurs, because the individual cases are not identical. Identity and difference are therefore related in such a way that identity is determined by difference and not vice versa. "The effect of time" (ibid., 109), sequentiality and recursiveness, are decisive for this.

In this type of repeatability, precisely in the concept of recursivity, the two moments of repeatability, which Deleuze distinguishes, are interpreted as emerging from each other. In the recursivity there is then the possibility of memory. Such is precisely not the case with Deleuze, or applies only to the general public, the naked, static repetition. In my opinion, this distinction between neostructuralism and systems theory stems from the fact that neostructuralism does not know systems in the sense of the concept of negentropy, but rather starts from a concept of dynamic energy and here from asymmetries.

According to Deleuze, the order of the general consists, as shown, in the "non-correspondence of difference and repetition" (Deleuze 1992, 44). He is referring here to Gabriel Tarde, whose entire theory is based on difference and repetition. Difference - in the case of internal repetition - "is at the same time the origin and the goal of the repetition". The differential and differentiating repetition replaces "the opposite". This then gives rise to "a completely different dialectic than the Hegelian one" (ibid., 45, note 16). According to this, as already shown, a difference is "an inner and yet non-conceptual difference" compared to a conceptual difference that ultimately amounts to unity. "The difference is (as shown, H. K.) within an idea, although it lies outside the concept as an object representation" (ibid., 45).

For Deleuze it was "perhaps the mistake of the philosophy of difference from Aristotle to Leibniz to Hegel that it confused the concept of difference with a mere conceptual difference by contenting itself with inscribing the difference in the concept in general" (ibid., 46). Marx had already demonstrated this in the self-movement of the concept in Hegel, without, however, like the neo-structuralists, simply substituting the difference for the contradiction. In Hegel the difference does not appear in the preconceptual and the movement of the concepts does not have its fundamentum in re in him, so that it cannot be determined in itself at all. That is idealism. Deleuze puts it this way: "In reality, as long as one inscribes the difference in the concept at all, one has no singular idea of ​​the difference and only stays with the element of a difference already mediated by the representation" (ibid., 46f). That would be the identity of the signifier and the signified, as Derrida calls it. On the other hand, there are only singular differences and corresponding shifts among the neostructuralists. But, as I said, this is a new positivity. Here thinking does not work on the principle of identity itself, as happens with Adorno, but subverts it. That makes a decisive difference z. B. from a critical social theory.The theoretical initial orientation of the neostructuralists, on the other hand, has a positive-affirmative character.




literature

Adorno, Th. W. (1975). On the metacritic of epistemology. In: Adorno, Th. W. Collected Writings, Vol. 5, Frankfurt / M.

Deleuze, G. (1992). Difference and repetition. Munich

Derrida, J. (1988). The différance. In: Derrida, J. Marginal passages of philosophy. Vienna

Derrida, J. (1994). Grammatology. Frankfurt / M.

Hegel, G. W. F .: Science of Logic, 2 Vols. In: Hegel, G. W. F .: Works in twenty volumes, Vol. 5 and 6, Frankfurt / M. [1986]

Heidegger, M .: Identity and Difference. Pfullingen [1990]

Horkheimer, M., Adorno, Th. W. (1984). Dialectic of Enlightenment. In: Adorno, Th. W .: Collected Writings, Vol. 3, Frankfurt / M.

Luhmann, N. (1990). The science of society. Frankfurt / M.

Marx, K .: Das Kapital, Vol. 1. In: MEW, Vol. 23, Berlin [1962]

Saussure, de F .: Basic questions in general linguistics. Berlin [1967]

Welsch, W. (1995). Reason. The contemporary critique of reason and the concept of transversal reason. Frankfurt / M.

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